Can someone explain to me if there is a difference between 'neurological' or 'logical' levels?

are they the same thing?

thanks
Rita

Hi Rita!

ritamascia wrote:

Can someone explain to me if there is a difference between 'neurological' or 'logical' levels?

Here's a brief overview of Robert Dilt's two similar but different models (with thanks to Andy Bradbury of Honest Abe's NLP Emporium for the write-up)...

The Logical Levels Model

• Spiritual: --- (who else) Transmission
• Who I am: Identity (Who) Mission
• My Belief System: Values, Criteria (Why) Permission & Motivation
• My Capabilities: States, Strategies (How) Direction
• What I do: Specific Behaviours (What) Actions
• My Environment: External Context (Where, When) Reactions

The Neuro-Logical Levels Model

• Spiritual: Holographic - Nervous system as a whole
• Identity: Immune system and Endocrine system - Deep life-sustaining functions
• Beliefs: Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) -Unconscious responses
• Capabilities: Cortical Systems - Semiconscious actions (eye movements, posture, etc.)
• Behaviours: Motor system (pyramidal and cerebellum)- Conscious actions
• Environment: Peripheral Nervous System (PNS) - Sensations and reflex actions

ritamascia wrote:

are they the same thing?

No, but they sometimes each refered to by the other's name, even by Robert Dilts on occasion!

As to the accuracy of the neurology here in light of recent discoveries, the usefulness of the constructs or the posibilities of new revisions or more useful alternatives, that might be another discussion entirely...

I hope that's helpful, Rita!

Be Well,

Michael Perez

Michael

thanks very much for your contribution.
Rita

... and those are Dilts' models - inspired, apparently, by Gregory Bateson's adaptation of certain mathematical distinctions made by Russell and Whitehead at the turn of the century in Principia Mathematica.

Dilts' use of the term 'logical levels' has been met with some criticism though - since other folks in the NLP world (such as John Grinder) use that term in reference to the essentially mathematical distinction that it described before Dilts used it to describe something completely different.

It's all to do with set theory. Imagine if you had a collection of different golf balls and you put them in a small box marked "golf balls". You might even have a bright orange golf ball. Now imagine if you also had a collection of baseballs, and you put those in a small box marked "baseballs".

You could put the contents of both of those boxes into a larger box simply marked "balls" - and you could also include a basketball, some tennis balls, etc.

So now you have a few ways of organising your balls, according to how specific or how general you want to be. We can represent these organising categories hierarchically, like this:

balls

golf balls --- baseballs --- tennis balls --- basketballs

... and within the category of "golf balls", you could go further:

brightly coloured golf balls --- white golf balls

... and within the category of "brightly coloured golf balls", you could go even further:

bright orange golf balls --- bright green golf balls --- bright yellow golf balls


Now, when you go to a more specific category, you're moving to a lower logical level. When you go to a more general category, you're moving to a higher logical level.

There are two rules that constrain this kind of ordering:

1) everything at any given logical level MUST meet ALL of the defining criteria of the level above (and by extension, of EVERY level above).

In other words, a bright green golf ball IS a brightly coloured golf ball, IS a golf ball, and IS a ball.

2) in addition to meeting all the defining criteria of the level above, everything at any given logical level must also meet at least one additional criterion further to those criteria that define the level above it.

In other words, there has to be something more specific about stuff on the next level down.

So to apply these distinctions to Dilts' models ... in order for his distinctions to make sense in terms of logical levels, the room I'm currently sitting in (my environment) must also be my identity, as well as one of my beliefs, and an example of my behaviour.

Now, sitting in this room might be an example of a behaviour, but the room itself is not a behaviour - it's a physical space. Believing that I'm sitting in this room might be an example of a belief, but the room itself is not a belief - believing things is an internal process that I do.

There's no obvious way in which Dilts' model(s) conform(s) to the mathematical principles drawn from Russell and Whitehead's work that are indicated by the term 'logical levels'. He appropriated the term and used it to describe something very different - and now lots of people in the NLP world have been introduced to the term 'logical levels' through exposure to Dilts' model(s), and have no idea about the set theory stuff.

Cheers,

James

Great analysis, James!

james_t wrote:

Dilts' use of the term 'logical levels' has been met with some criticism though - since other folks in the NLP world (such as John Grinder) use that term in reference to the essentially mathematical distinction that it described before Dilts used it to describe something completely different.

I'll add here that John also acknowledged having used the term 'logical level' outside of its usual definition, something he covers briefly in 'Whispering in the Wind'.

For people who might be interested in applications of set theory and logical levels in NLP, I'd recommend taking a look at Steve Andreas' work, 'Six Blind Elephants'.

And in the meanwhile, James put forward here in a few lines what it took 2 lectures for my professor in college to cover, so feel free to give him a round of applause!

Be Well,

Michael Perez

I couldn't agree more with Michael! Thanks James for a through explanation in 'non technical terms' .

I am converted to golf now and all those bright golf balls!

One thing I learnt today is to keep things simple. I am not going to use the expression 'neurological levels' in NLP ever again! From now I will refer to Dilt's logical levels and if anybody asks me anything about neurological levels well...they'll be treated to a link to James' reply!

many thanks again
Rita

Just one other point - there are actually THREE Dilts models, not just two. Get this (from Appendix C in "Changing Belief Systems with NLP")

If I understand what Dilts is trying to say:

Neurological levels - ALL Dilts' "levels" models

Logical Levels - the basic environment/behaviour/capabilities/etc. model

Neuro-logical levels - Dilts' redefinition of human neurophysiology in which he tries to attribute different levels of neurological activity to his "logical levels"

According to Andy Bradbury's FAQ on all this

Logical and Neurological Levels

The neuro-logical level model is entirely nonsensical because it claims that the "different levels bring deeper commitment of neurological curcuitry into action". So you only use all of your neurophysiology if you are being "spiritual" whatever that means. Apparently Dilts used Bateson's completely theoretical ideas about the structure and functions of the brain as the basis for these claims, and modern brain scanning results show Bateson was just plain wrong.

The one thing I personally think is genuinely useful in this is the recognition of how the way people talk about what they're doing can identify where they have got stuck

1. That's just not who I am (identity)
2. I don't think I could do that (belief)
3. I couldn't do that (capability)
4. I've never tried/done that before (behaviour)
5. I can't do my best in these circumstances (environment)

Trouble is, it doesn't necessarily make sense to say that you must to go to the next level up to clear a block.
In my examples you could ask questions of the same sort, like

5. Under what circumstances COULD you do it?
4. What would you already know if you HAD done it before?
3. If you could do it, where would you start?
2. Have you ever been able to do something in the past even though you started out thinking you couldn't?
1. What sort of person would someone have to be in order to do this?

Oh! The meter says I've just used up my tuppence.

Bye bye

Thanks Jack. This NLP stuff fascinates me, there is SO MUCH to learn about it!!

Cheers
Rita

Hi Jack,

jack wrote:

Apparently Dilts used Bateson's completely theoretical ideas about the structure and functions of the brain as the basis for these claims, and modern brain scanning results show Bateson was just plain wrong.

A quick word in defence of both Bateson and Dilts.

My understanding is that Dilts based his work on the example of Bateson's 'Logical Levels of Learning' and that the conjecture about neurology was his own, but I could well be wrong about that.

Dilts certainly used a bit of latitude in his description of the various neurological systems as he described them in that model to create a better comparative metaphor, but I wouldn't go so far as to say that he redefined them. The definitions that he used were not very far from the way that those things were defined at that time.

To my mind, the real problem was that later, when neurology moved on and we actually got a chance to see what was on the inside of people's brains and nervous systems and we had to reengineer our thinking about those things, the neuro-logical levels model was not updated or reengineered to reflect those changes.

It should also be said that although these models can be problematic, they also have been used effectively over the years. While I think they need to be overhauled or replaced to correct some of the basic design flaws, I'm also grateful that Robert did the work in the first place and that that work has been helpful to so many people over the years.

Be Well,

Michael Perez

Neurological levels is Dilts' application of the theory,and though often useful,has been accused of not conforming to the theory itself.
I regard Logical levels as more of a sorting process to enable clear thinking.
While interested parties could read"Steps to an ecology of mind"(Bateson),I'd regard James' explanation as much clearer than that of Bateson,who isn't always a particularly reader-friendly author.

Thinking about the non-neurology model - Here's another spin to consider...

The accuracy of (lets be safe and call it) the 'levels' model can be questioned, particularly when considering set theory - yet there is still practical merit in using it.

There is of course many a technique based on the levels and many speak of the success of such approaches.

And then there's the spin I'm thinking of... The six levels of purpose, identity, beliefs/values, capabilities, behaviour and environment can provide an interesting set of frames when wishing to investigate a situation or issue.

Take business for instance - the levels model can be very useful as a consultative tool.

All too often businesspeople forget that 'a person is not their behaviour' and immediately equate identity with behaviour. So in such a situation (e.g. a middle manager complaining about the behaviour of an employee) it can be very interesting and useful to suggest that behaviour is a consequence of the other levels.

Or if you wish... behaviour is the CONTENT and hence there is PROCESS to be considered which lead to or created this behaviour.

As such a conversation regarding purpose, identity, beliefs/values and capabilities (and even environment) can be a useful strategy when wishing to expand the perception of the middle manager in the example.

Obviously I am not suggesting this is the only way to approach such a situation - it is merely a demonstration that even an 'inaccurate' model can be useful!

Michael

your example of the middle manager made perfect sense. In fact as soon as I read it I thought of something in real life that reminded me of the usefulness of exploring the 6 levels in that context.

thanks for adding to the discussion
Rita